In parallel, the EU Directive on the security of network and information systems (NIS Directive) forces member states to adopt legal measures to boost the overall level of their cybersecurity by May 2018. 18 . In doing so, it speaks to four strands of cybersecurity literature touching upon military and intelligence entities.Footnote4 First, scholars have pointed out that the central (state) actors conducting cyber operations are intelligence agencies, and deceptive cyber operations, therefore, form part of an intelligence contest (Gartzke and Lindsay Citation2015; Rovner Citation2020). TENTH Fleet,CHIPS Magazine) 5 0 obj It has been more than a decade since France made cyberwar a national security priority and mandated the development of defensive and offensive cyber capabilities (Commission du Livre blanc sur la dfense et la scurit nationale Citation2008). In military operations the Intelligence Service coordinates the activity with the Armed Forces operational headquarters (FOH). 0 Fri: 10:00 - 15:30, NATO Secretary General's Annual Report 2020, NATO Secretary General's Annual Report 2019. /Title (Fleet Cyber Command sees future Cyber Warfighting Workforce developing at NPS) /Font 55 0 R Innovation, and ultimately the success of the naval mission, is based on three fundamental things: People, Information, and Ideas. Report to Congress on the annual long-range plan for construction of naval vessels for fiscal year 2020 prepared by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. It offers scrutiny of the challenges and opportunities faced by European countries when organizing their cyber capabilities and provides recommendations for policy development in the field. First, cyber operations are often custom-made combinations of intelligence, intrusion, and attack (Smeets Citation2018). hkkH|d~HRhmUdc+llb7,B4sn3s9c%LidC309O/Im-^#Zl# The capability and competence in offensive cyber operations is to be further developed (Forsvarsdepartementet Citation2020, 118). endobj The DCC concentrates on establishing and deploying defensive, intelligence, and offensive cyber capabilities. Some of this work is undertaken in collaboration with the civilian General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) in the Joint SIGINT Cyber Unit (JSCU). (Liebetrau Citation2022, 16). Educating the civil aviation workforce . Yet, the Ministry does neither elaborate further on the relationship between intelligence and military operations nor what the internal organizational diagram looks like. Recommended articles lists articles that we recommend and is powered by our AI driven recommendation engine. However, under the Joint Cyber Coordination Center (FCKS), the intelligence service collaborates and coordinates with the National Security Authority (NSM), the Policy Security Service (PST), and The National Criminal Investigation Service (Kripos) when it comes to countering and dealing with severe cyber operations (Forsvarsdepartementet Citation2020, 7677). << . endobj 138 0 obj <>stream /Creator (U.S. Fleet Cyber Command,U.S. >> NATO and the European Union work together to counter cyber threats, Deputy Secretary General stresses NATO will continue to increase Ukraines cyber defences, NATO and North Macedonia strengthen responses to cyber threats, NATO helps to strengthen Mongolia's cyber defence capacity, Deputy Secretary General at CYBERSEC: NATO is adapting to respond to cyber threats, New NATO hub will gather the Alliance's cyber defenders, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, Cybersecurity : A Generic Reference Curriculum, Cyber - the good, the bad and the bug-free. This update ensures the Navy's alignment with the most current strategic guidance, assesses the progress made since Version 1.0, and validates the initial design's characterization of the strategic environment. Unless DOD improves the monitoring of its key cyber strategies, it is unknown when DOD will achieve cybersecurity compliance. It is seldom distinct where one stage ends, and another begins. This document provides a discussion of how Naval Aviation leadership intends to support "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower," and is aligned to the Chief of Naval Operations' guidance, "A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority," and the Commandant of the Marine Corps' "FRAGO 01/2016: Advance to Contact." The signing of this arrangement is the latest example of long-standing cooperation on cyber defence between NATO and Finland. >> The DCC does not have mandate to play an active role in disrupting continuous adversarial cyber behavior short of war. This Arctic Strategic Outlook describes the United States Navy's strategic approach to protect U.S. national interests and promote stability in the Arctic. It has been replaced by the competition-dispute-confrontation triptych (Burkhard Citation2021, 8). hb```r ea8IYiX 'oqB"&QVHQDd"X::2::P *0bi=|%X5d%ZT~8d-Xb`ZEQS| The exploratory nature of the study ensures an empirical sensitivity in line with understanding cybersecurity as a situated and contextual object of study, rather than being predetermined by the existing theories and categories (Liebetrau and Christensen Citation2021). The doctrine calls for increased coordination and collaboration between the Cyber Command and the intelligence services. In 2018, the Norwegian Ministry of Defense (Forsvarsdepartementet Citation2018, 8) explained, in an investment plan accepted by the government, that. Norway has kept with this model in order to foster synergies and reduce the costs of developing and deploying cyber capabilities. /Version /1.5 >> It is the DONs responsibility to ensure our systems are secure, our infrastructure and weapon systems are survivable, and our cyber operators can strike in and through cyberspace at a time and place of the commanders choosing. The observed divergence in organizing cyber capabilities raises several questions for policy makers, practitioners, and scholars to consider. /Font 51 0 R These documents are supported by interviews with military personnel, civil servants, and scholars in the three countries. /Kids [4 0 R 5 0 R 6 0 R] Accordingly, cybersecurity research is increasingly guided by the empirical reality of persistent cyber operations across the conflict spectrum (Cavelty and Wenger Citation2020, 16). Taillat (Citation2019) finds the ambiguity to be partly deliberate, but stresses how it brings to light the resulting loopholes when attempting to draw organizational boundaries in a new context of operations. >> However, the Ministry does not elaborate on how the coordination between the intelligence service and the operational headquarters plays out or what it exactly entails. /Resources 10 0 R /Subject () The depiction of cyberspace as a warfighting domain contributed to developing the role of the French Ministry of the Armed Forces in cybersecurity matters. NATO and its Allies rely on strong and resilient cyber defences to fulfil the Alliance's core tasks of collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. Defensive Cyberspace Operations, to defend DOD or other friendly cyberspace. stream After two tragic, fatal collisions and other near misses at sea, the Readiness Reform and Oversight Council's (RROC) mandate was clear: make our Navy a safer and more combat-effective force that places the safety, readiness and training of our people first. Third, a literature on cybersecurity governance has examined how different models of publicprivate partnerships shape cyber crisis management (Boeke Citation2018a), how states navigate between functional and national security imperatives to design governance arrangements (Weiss and Jankauskas Citation2019), what governance requirements transboundary cyber crisis entail (Backman Citation2021), and how a Central Cyber Authority (CCA) can help structure national cyber defense (Matania, Yoffe, and Goldstein Citation2017). QDR seeks to adapt, reshape, and rebalance our military to prepare for the strategic challenges and opportunities we face in the years ahead. 245 0 obj <>stream View GAO-17-512. It is, however, unclear whether decision-makers have systematically assessed the implications of the organizational structure for the ways in which the two dimensions relate to and shape one another at strategic, tactical, and operational levels. In a memorandum released Feb. 12, 2019, Secretary of the Navy Richard V. Spencer outlines the Department of the Navy's new focus on education. The Top Five Cybersecurity Defense Insights for 2020 | 2020-06-11 Organizing cyber capabilities across military and intelligence entities is only one of many related components in long-term defense planning. While our work is far from complete, the following report highlights progress made and areas demanding our greatest focus to ensure success. DON strategy to treat innovation beyond just about buying a new platform or weapon system; by changing the way we think, challenging outdated assumptions, and removing bureaucratic processes that prevent great ideas from becoming reality. The future of Europe will revolve around digitisation and cybersecurity even more when looking at it from the defence angle. /Type /Page On January 27, 2017, President Donald Trump directed Secretary of Defense James Mattis to initiate a new Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Our Navy cannot build the framework for leadership development without first "Laying the Keel." Cybersecurity and defence for the future of Europe - EUobserver With the 2013 military programming law, the French defense saw the establishment of the first real operational cyber defense chain (Gry Citation2020). A key pillar in the organization of French cyber capabilities is a governance model that separates offensive missions and capabilities from defensive missions and capabilities (Desforges Citation2022; Liebetrau Citation2022). Cybersecurity has the attention of senior DoD officials and the Service chiefs. The Education for Seapower (E4S) study was a clean-sheet review of naval learning and focused on flagship institutions like the U.S. The paper proceeds by locating the study in relation to relevant debates in cybersecurity scholarship. 2 0 obj Ransomware is trending in the wrong direction: 62% of organizations were victimized by ransomware last year, up from 56% in 2018 and 55% in 2017. NATO Headquarters They argue that strategic outcomes in, through and from cyberspace are possible short of war (Michael and Harknett Citation2020, 1). Acting Secretary of the Navy Thomas Modly outlines his three broad priorities for leadership up and down the chain of command. PDF Fleet Cyber Command sees future Cyber Warfighting Workforce - CORE 1 0 obj PDF Cyberspace in Multi-Domain Battle - United States Army Early Assessment of Drone Fleet Defence in Depth Capabilities for Architecting Cyber Defense: A Survey of the Leading Cyber Reference endobj Navy Emphasizing Maritime Cybersecurity Investments %%EOF Asked by the newspaper Libration about the prospect for future operational cooperation, the head of ANSSI, Guillaume Poupard, has said that by 2025, I think we will have the obligation to have common platforms [bringing together defenders and attackers] to react effectively to the worst threats (Amaelle Citation2020). %PDF-1.5 % Report is in response to your request to conduct an independent Cybersecurity Readiness Review following the loss of significant amounts of Department of the Navy data. This article refers to offensive cyber capabilities as custom-made combinations of human and non-human elements that allow cyber operations to achieve impact across the spectrum of intelligence and attack. This calls for cooperation and coordination across military and intelligence entities. The 2017 Navy Program Guide describes the platforms, payloads, systems and technologies already fielded, and those being developed. 5. CDR_V2N1_2017.indd 17 3/9/17 10:41 PM. /Contents 34 0 R % >> While future research could examine these and other explanatory factors, it is paramount that researchers and policy makers devote greater attention to the organizing of cyber capabilities, including the operational and strategic implications of the organizational divergence across NATO and EU members. It increases design possibilities, enhances the speed of innovation, and offers an alternative for creating shapes closer to what an engineer might need, with fewer constraints. No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s). Arguably, the strict French division between defensive and offensive measures is being challenged by increased coordination and collaboration across defense, intelligence, and military institutions. Systematic attention has been less devoted to comparative empirical studies of the specific organization of cyber capabilities across military and intelligence agencies in European countries. /AAPL#3AKeywords [()] It also contains a series of powers and procedures such as the search of computer networks and interception. SECNAV Stem to Stern Comprehensive Review aims to find $40 billion in savings across the FY 2022-2026 Future Years Defense Program. The Concept of Cyber Defence Exercises (CDX): Planning, Execution The Ministry states that the ability to carry out offensive cyber operations depends on a very good understanding of the target. A cyber command function outside the Intelligence Service will, for Norway, be an unfortunate and costly solution. In 2017 it became the cyber defense command (COMCYBER) and was placed directly under the chief of staff of the armed force. /Pages 2 0 R This is in line with the strategic reviews recommendation (that has been picked up) to establish three coordinating bodies for cyber defense: le Comit directeur de la cyberdfense, le Comit de pilotage de la cyberdfense, le Center de coordination (C4) (Secrtariat gnral de la dfense et de la scurit nationale Citation2018, 137). << 98 0 obj <> endobj The collaboration between the DCC and MIVD/JSCU raises strategic and legal issues as the MIVD and JSCU operate under different political and legal mandates. /Contents 13 0 R Yet, there is very little public information on how the collaboration plays out between the ANSSI, COMCYBER, and the intelligence services. In the following, the three first of these are deployed as starting points for examining the organization of French cyber capabilities. Forum Cybersecurity Fellow. This should be done with great sensitivity to tangential elements of developing and deploying cyber capabilities such as strategic guidance, legal mandate, doctrinal procedures, human skills, technological capacity as well as the specificity of national contexts. This seems to overcome some of the challenges to organizational collaboration pointed out above, but the extent to which this is the case is hard to say, as it is unclear how intelligence and military operations complement each other in practice. Register to receive personalised research and resources by email. << It states that the post-cold war peace-crisis-war continuum no longer applies. Register a free Taylor & Francis Online account today to boost your research and gain these benefits: Organizing cyber capability across military and intelligence entities: collaboration, separation, or centralization, National Cyber Crisis Management: Different European Approaches, Hackers, Wiz Kids, en Offensieve Cyberoperaties, Bridging the Gap between Cyberwar and Cyberpeace, Cyber Security Meets Security Politics: Complex Technology, Fragmented Politics, and Networked Science, Intelligence Reform and the Transformation of the State: The End of a French Exception, A New Role for the Public? As an arctic and maritime nation, U.S. economic and security interests require the Navy to work closely with U.S. interagency and foreign maritime partners to safeguard access and exploitation of Arctic resources. >> Council of the European Union (19 June 2017), Council of the European Union (7 June 2017), European Commission - Fact sheet (6 July 2016), Council conclusions on cyber diplomacy (11 February 2015), Council of the European Union (1718 November 2014), European Commission - High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (7 February 2013), European Union - European External Action Service (7 February 2013). How do I access the full text of journal articles ? When is maneuvering in cyberspace for intelligence purposes vis-a-vis military cyberspace operations mutually exclusive, reinforcing, and supporting? Abstract. hb``f``6d```\01G030000_ffcy5!ew3K The United States is an Arctic nation, and the Coast Guard supports numerous experienced and capable partners in the region. The sinew of maneuver across all domains is the network. Today (16 February 2017), NATO and Finland stepped up their engagement with the signing of a Political Framework Arrangement on cyber defence cooperation. The final section concludes and offers recommendations for future academic and policy debate and design. This document, signed by Secretary of Defense Mark Esper and all three military service secretaries, outlines the Department of Defense's commitment to residents of military housing and their rights as tenants. 6 The Dutch intelligence services is known for having disrupted the Russian hacker groups Cozy Bear and Fance Bear (Hogeveen Citation2018) as well as the Russian military intelligence service Gru (Crerar, Henley, and Wintour Citation2018). The Alliance needs to be prepared to defend its networks and operations against the growing sophistication of the cyber threats it faces. B-1110 Brussels Naval Academy, Naval Postgraduate School, and Naval and Marine War Colleges, along with a fresh look at the relationships with civilian academic institutions and corporate learning structures. NATO will continue to adapt to the evolving cyber threat landscape. This collaboration is mentioned in research (Gudard Citation2020, Florant Citation2021) and journalism (Amaelle Citation2020) reviewing the development of French cyber capabilities. strategic picture to defend cyber key terrain to enable mission command. Photo: Navy. According to Stphane Taillat (Citation2019), a significant part of offensive cyber operations is the responsibility of the DGSE and lies outside of the French military cyber strategy. Existing scholarship has documented how European countries (Liebetrau Citation2022) and NATO (Jacobsen Citation2021) struggle to address such cyber aggressions below the threshold of war. /CreationDate (D:20150518000000-07'00') /Im2 57 0 R The arrangement will allow NATO and Finland to better protect and improve the resilience of their networks. [11] Multi-Domain operations rely on interdependent networks that also serve as the base . 230 0 obj <>/Filter/FlateDecode/ID[<82C9D454FA306544935F2BF957AE07B4>]/Index[202 44]/Info 201 0 R/Length 118/Prev 129030/Root 203 0 R/Size 246/Type/XRef/W[1 2 1]>>stream NATO Headquarters International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS), December 2018. The vision is anchored on a three-pronged approach of readiness, capability and capacity, and spans all aviation-related platforms and weapons. The "Naval Aviation Vision, 2016-2025" presents a unified U.S. Navy and Marine Corps roadmap to deliver the current readiness and future capability required of Naval Aviation in support of national strategy. This paper explores how the Netherlands, France, and Norway organize their cyber capabilities at the intersection of intelligence services and military entities and provides recommendations for policy and research development in the field. While there seems to be agreement on the cyber threat landscape, the model of future engagement and collaboration between NATO and the EU is in need of additional clarification. Naval Surface Force has developed its "Surface Force Strategy" which describes the return to sea control and implementation of Distributed Lethality. As an arctic and maritime nation, U.S . Belgium, Mon - Thu: 10:00 - 17:00 Civil aviation faces increased cybersecurity threats due to hyperconnectivity and the lack of standardized frameworks and cybersecurity defenses. Should deterrence fail, the Joint Force is prepared to win. The Unmanned Campaign Plan represents the Navy and Marine Corps strategy for making unmanned systems a trusted and integral part of warfighting. Commonwealth Heads of Government (20 April 2018), United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (February 2018), US Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, (16 March 2017), Department of Defense, United States (April 2015), 112th Congress (2011-2012), Senate Bill 3523 (H.R. This paper relies primarily on written public sources, such as official government statements and publications, media reports, and academic literature. DGSE is the most important service in this regard. Sep 2017, 11:26 . 120 0 obj <>/Filter/FlateDecode/ID[<75AFDF8CADBBE44E84785B8E85770F12><3A9CD3B0E9691541AA347CD2735C4F5E>]/Index[98 41]/Info 97 0 R/Length 108/Prev 121857/Root 99 0 R/Size 139/Type/XRef/W[1 3 1]>>stream An official website of the United States government, Department of the Navy Cyberspace Superiority Vision, Climate Action 2030 Department of the Navy, VA Vet Center (Supports vets, service members, and their families), Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2023, One Navy-Marine Corps Team: Strategic Guidance from the Secretary of the Navy, eport to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2022, After compiling and analyzing feedback from hundreds of Sailors through focus groups and surveys, Task Force One Navyin early 2021 submitted its final report, Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels, Prepared by: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, SECNAV Stem to Stern Comprehensive Review, Comprehensive Review of the DON Uniformed Legal Communities, Department of the Navy Strategic Guidance FY 2020, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, Department of the Navy's New Education Initiatives, A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority (Version 2.0), Navy Leader Development Framework (Version 3.0), Readiness Reform Oversight Committee: One Year Later, Naval Research and Development: A Framework for Accelerating to the Navy and Marine Corps after Next, Naval Research Enterprise (NRE) Addendum to the Naval Research and Development Framework, US Fleet Cyber Command/ Tenth Fleet Strategic Plan 2015-2020, New Navy Cryptologic & Cyber Warfare Community Vision Released, SECNAV Cybersecurity Readiness Review Letter, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal 2020, Laying the Keel: Developing the Backbone of Our Navy, REMARKS - Acting SECNAV at JFK Christening, REMARKS - Acting SECNAV at Navy Hampton Roads Chamber of Commerce, The President's Coronavirus Guidelines for America, US Navy Hospital Ship Leadership Biographies, Frequently asked questions about USNS Mercy, Frequently asked questions about USNS Comfort deployment to New York City, Hosted by Defense Media Activity - WEB.mil. /Annots [35 0 R 36 0 R 37 0 R 38 0 R 39 0 R 40 0 R 41 0 R 42 0 R 43 0 R 44 0 R This creates risks that operational capability and activity may be mismatched with broader strategic or governance goals, that the military and intelligence entities operate with different purposes and goals, that political decision-making is hampered, and that democratic oversight is hindered. The plan stresses that the ability of the e-service [foreign intelligence service] in peace, crisis and in armed conflict to follow, attribute, warn and actively counter digital threats also before events occur, shall be further developed. This was recently recalled, and contrasted with the Anglo-Saxon model, in the landmark 2018 Cyber Defense Strategic Review, drawn up under the authority of the General Secretariat for Defense and National Security (SGDSN). The study team developed a series of observations and recommendations for continuous learning throughout the naval services. What are the limitations, opportunities, and tensions? The Ministry of Defense (ibid) stresses that it will further develop the Intelligence Services ability to counter threats before incidents occur and emphasize that that cooperation and coordination between the above-mentioned actors in military cyber operations [the intelligence service and the FOH] will be strengthened, based on a military cyber operations center in the Intelligence Service. /ExtGState 54 0 R The deployment of cyber capabilities has a long history with the French foreign intelligence service The General Directorate for External Security (DGSE) (Gudard Citation2020). Photo: Defense Dept. The plan highlights the Navys work in coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to build a modernized naval force that makes needed contributions to advance the Joint Forces ability to campaign effectively, deter aggression, and, if required, win decisively in combat. However, it is unclear whether decision makers have systematically assessed how the organizational model allows for the operational capacity to travel from, translate into, and shape intelligence and military entities and to which strategic and governance implications. PDF The EU's Revised Cybersecurity Strategy. Half-Hearted Progress on Far Policy Brief ; 39. 2 A Chinese-led hacking spree exploiting vulnerabilities in Microsofts Exchange Server to gain access to more than 30.000 victims in the US alone (Conger and Frenkel Citation2021). (PDF) Israeli defense in the age of cyber war - ResearchGate How do I access the full text of journal articles ? 15 Days to slow the spread as outlined by the White House and CDC. Intelligence in the Cyber Era: evolution or Revolution? The United States is an Arctic nation1 through the state of Alaska and its surrounding territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone waters located in and around the Arctic Circle. Fifth, it remains unclear how defensive cyber- In 2014, the Netherlands established a Defence Cyber Command (DCC), with the aim to strengthen the countrys defense and offense in the cyber domain. Private Sector Cyber Defense : Can Active Measures Help Stabilize Cyberspace ? it is, according to the Ministry of Defense, neither necessary nor desirable to create a cyber command outside the Intelligence Service. Roles Responsibilities of Cyber Command Debated - National Defense Magazine 1 A Russian-led supply chain attack compromising the widely used SolarWinds software. The specifics of leader development will be shaped by community leaders to be consistent with this Framework, but the fundamental concepts discussed in this Framework apply to the entire Navy Team. Depending on how this is done and interpreted, it can qualify as an offensive cyber operation. NATO and Finland step up cyber defence cooperation The attack meant that Russian intelligence had potential access to as many as 18,000 SolarWinds customers. /Parent 2 0 R 7 The Joint Sigint and Cyber Unit (JSCU). Second, there is much ambiguity related to attribution, intention, and effect of cyber operations (Buchanan Citation2016). The observed divergence in organizing cyber capabilities is likely to be explained by multiple factors, including strategic posture, military culture, economic and human resources, and political will and attention. The article demonstrates how military-intelligence relations vary across the countries and identifies three organizing models: a Dutch collaboration model, a French separation model, and a Norwegian centralization model. endstream /Keywords (Cybersecurity, Spectrum, Telecommunications, Wireless) 3. /Rotate 0 The Naval Research and Development Framework outlines processes for speeding new technologies from basic research into finished products, and into Sailor or Marine hands.
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